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FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LLC MANAGERS: 
ARE THEY SUBJECT TO PROSPECTIVE WAIVER UNDER 




Fiduciary duties are imposed upon managers of New York 
LLCs under both the express provisions of the statute and the 
common law supplementing the statute. Less clear is whether such 
fiduciary duties may be waived, prospectively, in an LLC operating 
agreement under New York law.  In Pappas v. Tzolis, the New York 
Supreme Court; the Appellate Division, First Department; and, 
ultimately, the Court of Appeals, faced a case potentially raising this 
question and provided four somewhat different analyses of the range 
of possible issues presented (the Appellate Division included both a 
majority and dissent).  Of most significance for purposes of this 
article, some have suggested that the Court of Appeals answered the 
question raised herein by holding that fiduciary duties of managers 
are indeed subject to contractual waiver under New York law.  This 
article reaches a contrary conclusion, suggesting that the Court of 
Appeals never reached the issue, and further suggesting the 
likelihood of a contrary result in the event it may do so in the future. 
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION—DUTIES OF MANAGERS TO 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
A limited liability company (LLC) is generally run by 
“managers” for the benefit of its “member” owners.  These managers 
may or may not also be members of the LLC.  In either event, these 
managers, as such, will have certain duties to the LLC based on (1) 
contract; (2) statute; and (3) common law.  The basic contours of 
these duties are generally similar under different state statutes, though 
some of the details will vary from state to state.  This article will 
focus on fiduciary duties of managers under New York LLC Law 
and, more importantly, the potential prospective waiver of these 
duties. 
This introductory Part I will very briefly lay out the basic 
duties under New York law.  Part II will then address the potential 
waiver or elimination of such duties under both New York and 
Delaware law.  Finally, Part III will analyze a recent New York case 
involving an attempted waiver of fiduciary duties and the potential 
effectiveness of that waiver under New York and Delaware law, 
respectively.  This analysis will begin with a guided tour of the case, 
as it moved through the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, and Court of Appeals, and will conclude by addressing two 
key issues not addressed by the New York Court of Appeals.  First, 
however, we begin with the basic duties of LLC managers. 
A. Contract Duties 
The basic duties of managers to an LLC are typically defined 
by contract (much as the basic duties of any agent are defined by 
contract with the principal).  These “contract” duties are often found 
in the operating agreement,1 though they may also be addressed in 
other contracts between the LLC and its managers.  Each manager is 
obligated to comply with his or her contractual duties, unless contrary 
to mandatory law governing LLCs.  To the extent that such duties are 
not defined by contract, they may be defined by reference to the 
default provisions of the governing law, as found in the LLC statute 
or supplemented by common law. 
 
1 See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417 (McKinney 1996). 
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B. Statutory Duties and Limitations 
Managers of an LLC are required to perform their duties, as 
such, “in good faith and with that degree of care that an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances.”2  This duty of care is often broken down into 
“substance” and “process,” with managers generally afforded the 
substantial deference of the “business judgment rule” in the absence 
of any defect in their decision-making process. 
Moreover, transactions between the manager and the LLC in 
which the manager is deemed personally “interested” are statutorily 
“limited” in that they must be specially approved in accordance with 
the statute.3  The statute thereby seeks a balance between concerns on 
one hand over transactions in which a manager may have split 
loyalties and potentially significant benefits to the LLC on the other 
that may arise from a transaction, even though a manager has 
potentially competing financial interests. 
While a duty of “loyalty” is, to some degree, inherent in 
NYLLCL § 411, referenced in the previous paragraph, the statute 
does not expressly address any duty of loyalty in the context of 
potential competition with (as opposed to contracting with) the LLC.  
This aspect of the duty of loyalty might be “implied” from the 
language of NYLLC § 409(a) requiring “good faith,” but is more 
often said to be derived from the common law. 
C. Common Law Duties and Limitations 
A common law fiduciary duty of loyalty is generally imposed 
on all corporate directors and LLC managers, even in the absence of 
any specific statutory provision addressing the issue.  The roots of 
such duty are often traced to Judge Cardozo’s seminal opinion in 
Meinhard v. Salmon,4 which describes the nature of this duty as 
follows: 
[Partners] owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. . . .  A trustee 
is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of 
 
2 Id. § 409(a). 
3 See id. § 411. 
4 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
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an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of 
behavior.  As to this there has developed a tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate.  Uncompromising 
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty 
by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular 
exceptions.  Only thus has the level of conduct for 
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that 
trodden by the crowd.  It will not consciously be 
lowered by any judgment of this court.5 
Judge Cardozo noted the potential for waiver of such a duty with 
proper notice of a specific opportunity at the time it arose, but 
declined to opine on the effectiveness of such a waiver.6  It is hard to 
imagine that the court would have countenanced a prospective waiver 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty—in effect, a “blank check” without 
limits on its nature or amount. 
Strictly speaking, Meinhard v. Salmon was a partnership case.  
However, its language and logic have been extended beyond the 
partnership context7 to stand for a fiduciary duty of loyalty to a 
common enterprise that generally precludes individual pursuit of 
financial opportunities reasonably related and available to the 
common enterprise.  The general imposition of a duty of loyalty that 
restricts usurpation of a corporate opportunity or competition with the 
corporation is broadly accepted, though its precise contours may 
remain subject to some variation and debate.  What is far less clear is 
whether such a duty may be waived prospectively, effectively 
allowing individuals managing a common enterprise to compete, 
simultaneously, with each other and with the enterprise itself, without 
breaching any duty to the common enterprise. 
 
5 Id. at 546 (internal citation omitted). 
6 Id. at 547. 
7 See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander of N.Y., Inc. v. Fritzen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 530, 534-35 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (applied to a New York corporation); cf. Tzolis v. Wolff, 884 
N.E.2d 1005 (N.Y. 2008) (relying on a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty of those in 
control of an LLC in implying the right of plaintiffs to bring a derivative action in response 
to such breach). 
5
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II. WAIVER OR ELIMINATION OF LIABILITY OF DUTIES OF 
MANAGERS TO A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
One might reasonably begin by asking why a group of 
individuals engaged in a common enterprise would ever wish to 
waive or eliminate duties of the individuals to act loyally for the 
benefit of that common enterprise.  However, enterprises take many 
forms, and a group of individuals may be more interested, 
prospectively, in litigation avoidance than in imposing limitations or 
restrictions on the actions of those responsible for the common 
enterprise.  Part II begins with two exemplary cases—one in a 
partnership context8 (decided under Oklahoma law) and one in an 
LLC context9 (decided under Ohio law) and then moves to examine 
the New York and Delaware statutes addressing the same basic issue 
in the context of an LLC.  A thorough examination of the nature and 
extent of the applicable New York LLC statute further requires us to 
look more fully at its origin in the New York Business Corporation 
law.  With this understanding of the relevant New York and 
Delaware statutes in hand, we can then be ready to move on to 
consider the case at issue in Part III. 
A. Prospective Contractual Waivers or Elimination of 
the Basic Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty—Two 
Exemplary Cases 
An Oklahoma oil and gas partnership agreement expressly 
allowed partners to engage in competitive oil and gas transactions for 
their own individual accounts, even where such transactions might 
directly and negatively affect the financial interests of the 
partnership.10  The contract clause allowing for such conduct 
provided as follows: 
Each partner shall be free to enter into business and 
other transactions for his or her own separate 
individual account, even though such business or other 
transaction may be in conflict with and/or competition 
with the business of this partnership.  Neither the 
partnership nor any individual member of this 
 
8 See infra note 10. 
9 See infra note 16. 
10 Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 768 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981). 
6
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partnership shall be entitled to claim or receive any 
part of or interest in such transactions, it being the 
intention and agreement that any partner will be free 
to deal on his or her own account to the same extent 
and with the same force and effect as if he or she were 
not and never had been members of this partnership.11 
Two of the partners individually acquired oil and gas rights in which 
their broader partnership had also shown an interest in acquiring.12  
When the partnership sought to impose a constructive trust, the court 
rejected the claim by reference to the contractual provision quoted 
above.13  The court noted and gave effect to the clear language 
allowing “spirited, if not outright predatory competition between the 
partners” even to the extent “as if there never had been a 
partnership.”14  While noting typical fiduciary obligations arising in 
the context of a partnership, the court gave effect to the parties’ 
agreement in waiving liability for any actions short of individual 
partners stealing or otherwise misusing “existing” partnership 
assets.15 
A group of investors hoping to secure and operate an NHL 
professional hockey franchise formed an LLC expressly for that 
purpose.16  Within the same time frame, Hunt, a managing member of 
that LLC, sought and successfully secured for his own personal 
benefit the same franchise sought by the LLC.17  In a legal action to 
determine whether Hunt’s actions had violated any fiduciary duty to 
his co-venturers in the LLC, the court ruled that he had not by relying 
on the following provision in the LLC operating agreement: 
Members May Compete.  Members shall not in any 
way be prohibited from or restricted in engaging or 
owning an interest in any other business venture of 
any nature, including any venture which might be 
competitive with the business of the Company.18 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 768-69. 
13 Id. at 770. 
14 Id. at 772. 
15 Singer, 634 P.2d at 772-73. 
16 McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). 
17 Id. at 1200-01. 
18 Id. at 1206. 
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In each of these two cases, a group of co-venturers sought to limit, 
and perhaps even eliminate, fiduciary obligations to their co-
venturers, allowing for, as the Singer court expressed “spirited, if not 
outright predatory competition between the partners.”19  Moreover, 
the seemingly broad and unequivocal language suggests a strong 
intent by the parties to avoid exactly the sort of litigation that 
ultimately transpired.  The question is whether such a prospective 
waiver should be enforceable.  The two courts above said yes.20  
However, individual state laws governing LLCs differ.  In this article, 
we will initially examine the laws of both Delaware and New York, 
which provide for useful comparative analysis.  However, we will 
ultimately focus on the law of New York, as applied to this question. 
B. Statutory Provisions Addressing Waiver or 
Elimination of the Basic Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty 
under Delaware and New York Law 
The statutory duties of managers to an LLC are of course 
subject to waiver or elimination only to the extent allowed by 
statute.21  Common law duties, such as the fiduciary duty of loyalty, 
might, at least in theory, be subject to waiver or elimination under the 
common law as well.  However, there is little precedent allowing for 
prospective waiver of a common law fiduciary duty of loyalty (the 
Oklahoma case above being relatively unique), and the authors are 
aware of no such New York case.  In fact, such a prospective waiver 
is arguably inconsistent with the very nature of the fiduciary 
relationship described by the New York Court of Appeals in 
Meinhard v. Salmon.22  Thus, any right to waive or eliminate the 
basic fiduciary duty—including the common law duty of loyalty—
must likely be found in an applicable statute.  We now turn our 
attention to the relevant Delaware and New York statutes, which 
present a rather stark contrast. 
 
19 Singer, 634 P.2d at 772. 
20 See id. at 772 (holding that the agreement was “designed to allow and was uniquely 
drafted to promote spirited, if not outright predatory competition between the partners”).  See 
also McConnell, 725 N.E.2d at 1222 (finding that the partner’s actions “were in no way 
impermissible under the operating agreement”). 
21 See supra note 1.  Some statutory duties may be mandatory, while others may be 
subject to waiver or modification by agreement, provided any statutory requirements for 
such waiver or modification are met. 
22 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
8
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1. The Delaware Statute 
The Delaware statute is unique to Limited Liability Company 
law and expressly seeks “to give maximum effect to the principle of 
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability 
company agreements,”23 even where such freedom may go beyond 
traditional common law doctrine, such as that imposing a duty of 
loyalty on managers.24  The statute expressly allows for contractual 
modification or elimination of the duties of an LLC member or 
manager (including any fiduciary duties), with the sole limitation 
“that the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”25  In 
short, the only limitation under the Delaware statute on the parties’ 
right to eliminate fiduciary duties by contract is, itself, grounded in 
the common law of contract.  The duty of good faith, as a matter of 
contract law, is a mandatory rule and is not subject to waiver by the 
parties.  The Delaware LLC statute merely reiterates that common 
law rule.26  However, any fiduciary duty arising from the unique 
nature of a manager’s role in an LLC is fully subject to prospective 
waiver under Delaware law.27 
2. The New York Statute 
In contrast to Delaware’s use of a unique statutory provision 
crafted specifically for LLCs, the only New York LLC provision 
addressing waiver of duties of a manager to an LLC or its members is 
taken almost verbatim from the New York Business Corporation 
Law.28  This statutory provision begins by broadly allowing for the 
inclusion within the LLC operating agreement of a contractual 
“provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of managers 
to the limited liability company or its members for damages for any 
 
23 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §18-1101(b) (West 2013). 
24 Id. § 18-1101(a). 
25 Id. § 18-1101(c) (emphasis added); see also id. § 18-1101(d)-(j) (further elaborating on 
the broad deference to contract under the statute). 
26 See id. § 18-1101(c). 
27 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §18-1101(c). 
28 See generally N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a)(1) (the LLC provision allowing for 
elimination or limitation of personal liability of managers) and N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 
402(b)(1) (McKinney 1998) (the provision in the Business Corporation Law allowing for 
elimination or limitation of personal liability of directors). 
9
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breach of duty in such capacity . . . .”29  However, this broad grant is 
then substantially limited to preclude elimination or limitation of 
liability where, inter alia, the manager’s “acts or omissions were in 
bad faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation 
of law” or the manager “personally gained in fact a financial profit 
or other advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled.”30  
This substantial limiting language appears to provide for a far 
narrower range of application than the Delaware statute above, in 
effect, allowing the parties far less autonomy in limiting or 
eliminating the duties of managers or liability for any breach thereof. 
In Pappas v. Tzolis,31 addressed in Part III, none of the courts 
directly address NYLLCL § 417(a), even though the supreme court 
decision directly addresses the effectiveness of a prospective waiver 
of fiduciary duty, which would seem to fall directly within the scope 
of the statutory language.  As further explained in Part III, the Court 
of Appeals avoided any decision as to the effectiveness of the 
prospective waiver.  However, our own “hypothetical” exploration of 
this issue requires us to consider the statute and its history in some 
detail. 
a. The Genesis of NYBCL § 402(b)—
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Duty of 
Corporate Directors to Inform 
Themselves 
The evolutionary history of NYLLCL § 417(a) begins with a 
case involving the duties of corporate directors to take reasonable 
steps to inform themselves before taking action on behalf of the 
corporation.  In New York, this duty is found in NYBCL § 717(a) 
and the duty of directors to act “with that degree of care which an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances”—often called the “duty of care.”32  Similar duties 
were historically imposed under most corporation laws, including 
Delaware.  Significantly, the inquiry was typically very fact specific, 
with significant deference to the directors in balancing the need for 
prompt action with the need for more information, consistent with the 
 
29 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a). 
30 Id. § 417(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
31 982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012). 
32 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(a). 
10
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business judgment rule.  That all changed when the Delaware 
Supreme Court handed down its controversial decision in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom.33 
i. The Basic Conundrum of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom 
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the board of directors of Trans 
Union Corporation had made a decision to sell the business in its 
entirety.34  The selling price was significantly higher than the market 
price at which the company’s shares were trading at the time.35  
However, the negotiations occurred between a small group over a 
compressed period of time, and the board decision happened very 
quickly.36  The case represented the classic challenge in which the 
directors were required to balance the need for prompt action with the 
potential that they might learn more with further analysis and 
deliberation.37  The directors opted in favor of moving quickly (a 
view supported by counsel, who suggested they might get sued if 
they did not accept the offer then on the table), likely confident that 
their decision would be protected by the business judgment rule.38  
However, the Delaware Supreme Court thought otherwise.39 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors of Trans 
Union were not, in this case, entitled to the benefit of the business 
judgment rule, because they had failed to exercise due care in 
informing themselves.40  Thus, all were exposed to personal liability 
to the extent of any determination that Trans Union had been sold for 
less than fair value.41  The corporate response was swift and 
overwhelmingly critical.  Insurance premiums for directors and 
officers skyrocketed, and boards became far more fearful of quick 
decision-making, without exhaustive analysis (which may or may not 
be a good thing, depending on the circumstances).42  The legislative 
 
33 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
34 Id. at 865. 
35 Id. at 865-68. 
36 Id. at 869. 
37 Id. at 880. 
38 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868. 
39 Id. at 874. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 893. 
42 Lynn A. Howell, Post Smith v. Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation with a 
11
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responses were also swift. 
ii. The Common Statutory 
Solution to this Conundrum 
In Delaware, the legislature enacted and the Governor signed, 
on June 18, 1986, Title 8 §102(b)(7),43 essentially allowing for 
limitation or elimination of liability arising from a director’s duty of 
care, but precluding any such waiver of a director’s duty of good 
faith, loyalty, or improper self-dealing.44  The vast majority of 
Delaware corporations promptly took advantage of §102(b)(7).  A 
majority of other states quickly followed suit,45 including New York, 
which, in 1987, enacted New York Business Corporations Law § 
402(b).46 
Significantly, however, neither the Delaware nor the New 
York legislative response to Smith v. Van Gorkom in any way 
provided for prospective waiver of director liability for a breach of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty or for improper self-dealing.  As 
indicated in Part II.B.1 above, Delaware has independently taken this 
latter step with respect to LLC managers.47  New York, however, has 
taken a very different approach. 
 
Proactive Perspective, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 564-68 (1988). 
43 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (West 2013). 
44 Howell, supra note 42, at 568-69. 
45 Id. at 569. 
46 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney 2015): 
The certificate of incorporation may set forth a provision eliminating or 
limiting the personal liability of directors to the corporation or its 
shareholders for damages for any breach of duty in such capacity, 
provided that no such provision shall eliminate or limit: (1) the liability 
of any director if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to him 
establishes that his acts or omissions were in bad faith or involved 
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law or that he 
personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which 
he was not legally entitled or that his acts violated section 719, or (2) the 
liability of any director for any act or omission prior to the adoption of a 
provision authorized by this paragraph. 
Id. 
47 See supra notes 24-28. 
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b. Transporting the Statutory Response 
to Smith v. Van Gorkom to an LLC 
Statute 
In enacting its LLC statute in 1994 (post Smith v. Van 
Gorkom), the legislature largely copied and pasted the language of 
New York Business Corporations Law § 402(b)(1) into New York 
Limited Liability Company Law § 417(a)(1).48  The statutory 
provisions (contained in footnotes below) are easily compared, and 
the changes are limited as follows: (1) corporation is changed to 
limited liability company; (2) directors are changed to managers; (3) 
shareholders are changed to members; (4) female pronouns are added 
to male pronouns; and (5) certain LLC statutory provisions are 
substituted for comparable New York Business Corporations Law 
statutory provisions regarding certain specific director liability.49  
None of the above changes address the basic effect of the statute, and 
none in any way change the effectiveness of any waiver of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty of a director or manager, respectively.  Thus, 
one can reasonably infer that the legislature’s intent in transporting 
the language of New York Business Corporations Law § 402(b)(1) 
into New York Limited Liability Company Law § 417(a)(1) was 
simply to allow the members of an LLC to address the concerns 
raised by Smith v. Van Gorkom and limit or eliminate any liability for 
failing to inform themselves adequately before making a decision—
but certainly not to allow for a waiver of a manager’s fiduciary duty 
of loyalty. 
 
48 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a): 
The operating agreement may set forth a provision eliminating or 
limiting the personal liability of managers to the limited liability 
company or its members for damages for any breach of duty in such 
capacity, provided that no such provision shall eliminate or limit: (1) the 
liability of any manager if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse 
to him or her establishes that his or her acts or omissions were in bad 
faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law or 
that he or she personally gained in fact a financial profit or other 
advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled or that with respect 
to a distribution the subject of subdivision (a) of section five hundred 
eight of this chapter his or her acts were not performed in accordance 
with section four hundred nine of this article; or (2) the liability of any 
manager for any act or omission prior to the adoption of a provision 
authorized by this subdivision. 
Id. 
49 See supra notes 46 and 48. 
13
Graves and Davydan: Fiduciary Duties of LLC Managers
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
452 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
III. PAPPAS V. TZOLIS—WHAT THE NEW YORK COURT OF 
APPEALS DID AND DID NOT SAY 
In Pappas v. Tzolis,50 the Court of Appeals had an opportunity 
to discuss the issue of prospective waiver of fiduciary duties under 
New York law.  Instead, however, the Court of Appeals grounded its 
decision entirely in a subsequent “Certificate” executed by the parties 
in which any existing claims for breach of any fiduciary duties were 
expressly released, and any then-existing fiduciary duties were 
expressly disclaimed.51  The path of this litigation through the New 
York Supreme Court, the Appellate Division, and Court of Appeals is 
outlined below, after which we return to the questions that were not 
answered by the Court of Appeals—including the question of 
whether a prospective waiver is effective in limiting or eliminating 
the fiduciary duties of managers of an LLC under New York law. 
A. The Facts of the Case 
Steve Tzolis and plaintiffs formed Vrahos LLC for the 
purpose of leasing a building in Manhattan.52  The lease commenced 
in January 2006 and required payment by the LLC of a security 
deposit of $1,192,500, along with personal guarantees from Tzolis 
and plaintiff Steve Pappas as to payment of ongoing rent by the 
LLC.53  The LLC operating agreement specified that Tzolis would 
personally advance the security deposit on behalf of the LLC and 
provided that, as consideration for advancing the security deposit, 
Tzolis would have certain specified rights to enter into a sublease of 
the property from the LLC.54  Under such sublease, Tzolis would pay 
additional monies to the LLC above the rental payments that the LLC 
was required to pay directly to the landlord.55  Tzolis soon exercised 
his right to sublease the building.56 
By late 2006, however, a variety of issues had arisen between 
Tzolis and the others, leading Tzolis to suggest that he acquire their 
 
50 982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012). 
51 Id. at 578-80. 
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interests in the LLC.57  Plaintiffs agreed and negotiated buyouts of 
$1,000,000 for plaintiff Pappas and $500,000 for plaintiff 
Ifantopoulos (for which they had originally paid $50,000 and 
$25,000, respectively), which were completed by early 2007.58  The 
agreements between plaintiffs and Tzolis were accompanied by a 
signed, handwritten “Certificate,” which provided, in pertinent part, 
that: 
[E]ach of the undersigned Sellers, in connection with 
their respective assignments to Steve Tzolis of their 
membership interests in Vrahos LLC, has performed 
their own due diligence in connection with such 
assignments.  Each of the undersigned Sellers has 
engaged its own legal counsel, and is not relying on 
any representation by Steve Tzolis or any of his agents 
or representatives, except as set forth in the 
assignments & other documents delivered to the 
undersigned Sellers today.  Further, each of the 
undersigned Sellers agrees that Steve Tzolis has no 
fiduciary duty to the undersigned Sellers in connection 
with such assignments.59 
Six months after the assignment of plaintiffs’ interest to Tzolis, 
Vrahos LLC, now wholly owned by Tzolis, assigned its lease to 
nonparty Charlton Soho LLC for $17.5 million.60  In the ensuing 
legal action, Pappas asserted that he later discovered (unbeknownst to 
plaintiffs at the time) that Tzolis had begun negotiating the 
assignment of the lease to nonparty Extell Development Company, 
Charlton’s owner, a number of months before plaintiffs assigned their 
interests in the LLC to Tzolis.61 
The above referenced LLC Operating Agreement also 
contained the following potentially relevant provision: 
Any Member may engage in business ventures and 
investments of any nature whatsoever, whether or not 
in competition with the LLC, without obligation of 
 
57 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 442. 
58 Id. at 442-43; Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 578. 
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any kind to the LLC or to the other Members.62 
Vrahos LLC was organized as a Delaware limited liability company 
under Delaware LLC law.  However, the Operating Agreement 
included a choice of law provision63 expressly providing that the 
agreement was governed by New York law.
 64 
In short, Tzolis had purchased the interests of his co-venturers 
in the LLC for an amount equal to roughly twenty times their original 
investment.65  However, Tzolis had, a relatively short time later, 
resold those same interests (along with his own original interest) at an 
even greater profit (valuing the LLC at roughly seven times what 
Tzolis paid in buying out the other LLC members), to the exclusion 
of his original co-venturers.66  Moreover, Tzolis had allegedly begun 
negotiating the ultimate sale while still engaged in the original co-
venture with plaintiffs.67  Assuming these facts to be true, Tzolis 
might have raised two potentially distinct defenses: (1) the Operating 
Agreement provision purporting to allow “competition with the LLC” 
(and perhaps waiving any fiduciary duty to his co-venturers in the 
LLC); and (2) the provision of the “Certificate” purporting to 
disclaim or waive any fiduciary duty in connection with the 
assignment to Tzolis of plaintiffs’ interests in the LLC.  This 
distinction is important in considering the decisions of each of the 
New York courts addressing plaintiffs’ claims. 
B. The Decision of the Supreme Court 
Plaintiffs brought various claims against Tzolis, including a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and Tzolis moved to dismiss.68  
On the motion, the parties disagreed as to the governing law, with 
Tzolis arguing Delaware law and plaintiffs insisting on New York 
 
62 See infra note 72. 
63 In most cases, the inclusion in any agreement of an express choice of law provision will 
add a degree of certainty to the resolution of any subsequent question or dispute.  However, 
the inclusion in an LLC operating agreement of any such choice other than the state of 
organization would seemingly only inject uncertainty based on the inherent conflict between 
the near universally embraced “internal affairs doctrine,” and the parties’ express choice. 
64 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 442. 
65 Id. at 447. 
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law.69  The Supreme Court sided with Tzolis on the merits, but 
avoided the complex choice of law issue by deciding that both 
Delaware and New York law rendered the same result.70 
In dismissing the breach of fiduciary claim, the Supreme 
Court relied on the above-referenced provision of the Operating 
Agreement that allowed members to “engage in business ventures 
and investments of any nature whatsoever, whether or not in 
competition with the LLC, without obligation of any kind to the LLC 
or to the other Members.”71  The court held that this provision 
effectively eliminated the members’ respective fiduciary duties to 
each other under both New York and Delaware law “from the start of 
the LLC.”72  The Delaware LLC statute,73 as the Supreme Court 
explained, allowed such prospective waiver in LLC operating 
agreements, with the exception of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implied as a matter of basic contract law.74  The court further 
concluded that the parties’ contract to have no fiduciary duties to 
each other and to the LLC was lawful under New York law and did 
not violate its public policy.75  As such, plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary 
duty claim failed under both Delaware and New York law based on 
the prospective waiver of such duties in the Operating Agreement.76 
Significantly, however, the court’s analysis of the Operating 
Agreement under New York law failed to cite any statutory authority 
or even mention § 417 of NYLLCL.  Instead, the court grounded its 
conclusion upon the broad principle of freedom of contract, ignoring 
a potentially significant limitation imposed by the applicable New 
York LLC statute. 
C. The Decision of the Appellate Division 
The Appellate Division took a different approach.  Seemingly 
assuming that Delaware law governed,77 the appellate court explained 
 
69 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 443. 
70 Id. at 444. 
71 Id. at 442. 
72 Pappas v. Tzolis, No. 601115/09, 2010 WL 8367478, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 
2010). 
73 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West 2013). 
74 Pappas, 2010 WL 8367478, at *3. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 445.  While the case was in the Appellate Division, plaintiffs 
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that while permitting prospective waiver of fiduciary duties, 
Delaware law required such waiver to be “explicit.”78  In the court’s 
view, Tzolis did not establish that the subject provision of the 
Operating Agreement “explicitly” waived all traditional fiduciary 
duties as required by Delaware law.79  Hence, at the time of the buy-
out transaction, Tzolis still owed some fiduciary duty to plaintiffs, 
and the Certificate, purportedly releasing him from any liability 
arising from his fiduciary duties, moved front and center as the focus 
of the court’s analysis.80 
In the Certificate, executed as part of the New York buy-out 
transaction (and therefore governed by New York law), plaintiffs 
expressly acknowledged that Tzolis owed them no fiduciary duty.  
But, the court invalidated this purported disclaimer relying on New 
York law.81  The Appellate Division held that Tzolis had “an 
overriding duty to disclose his dealings with Extell to plaintiffs 
before they assigned their interests in Vrahos to him”82 because the 
relationship of trust still existed between the members at the time of 
the assignment of plaintiffs’ interest.83 
The dissent seemingly agreed that the language of the 
Operating Agreement was insufficient to provide an effective 
prospective waiver of all fiduciary duties under Delaware law.84
 
 
However, the dissenting judges concluded that under New York law85
 
the Certificate discharged Tzolis from any liability arising from his 
 
continued to argue that New York law applied based on the choice of law clause in the 
Operating Agreement.  The appellate court’s decision on Tzolis’ prospective waiver 
argument is based solely on Delaware law, with no choice of law analysis and no analysis of 
the New York LLC statute. 
78 Id. (citing Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 
2010)). 
79 Id. 
80 Notably, Tzolis’ argument was based on the waiver provision in the Operating 
Agreement, rather than on the Certificate.  As suggested by the decision of the Supreme 
Court, Tzolis contended that the Certificate merely corroborated the parties’ intent to 
disclaim all fiduciary duties.  Id. 
81 Id. at 445 (relying primarily on Blue Chip Emerald v. Allied Partners, 750 N.Y.S.2d 
291 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002)). 
82 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 446. 
83 Id. at 445. 
84 Id. at 449. 
85 Id. at 450 (Freedman, J., dissenting).  The dissent relied on Centro Empresarial 
Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001 (N.Y. 2011), a case 
that criticized the Appellate Division’s decision in Blue Chip Emerald and upheld the 
parties’ right to release each other from claims arising out of fiduciary duties. 
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fiduciary duties.86  In effect, the dissent presented a new theory, 
which Tzolis had not argued either in the court below or on appeal, 
laying ground for the Court of Appeals’ review.  While the Appellate 
Division reinstated the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, it 
shifted the focus of the dispute from the validity of the prospective 
waiver provision in the Operating Agreement to the effect of the 
purported release in the Certificate.87 
D. A Rather Ordinary Decision by the Court of 
Appeals 
The decision of the Court of Appeals does not discuss the 
Operating Agreement or the parties’ purported prospective waiver of 
fiduciary duties at all.  Rather, it deals with one and only one issue 
with respect to plaintiffs’ claim of breach of fiduciary duty—whether 
the Certificate effectively released Tzolis from any such claim. 
The Court’s prior precedent established that a principal could 
release its fiduciary from claims where “the fiduciary relationship is 
no longer one of unquestioning trust.”88  Applying this principle to 
the specific circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the release in the Certificate was valid because at the time of the buy-
out the parties’ relationship had already deteriorated and plaintiffs 
could not reasonably rely on Tzolis as their fiduciary.89 
While Tzolis ultimately prevailed, his victory at the Court of 
Appeals rested on a different ground than at the trial court.  The 
Supreme Court found that the parties prospectively waived their 
respective fiduciary duties to each other by means of the provision in 
the Operating Agreement.90  The Appellate Division found that the 
Operating Agreement did not provide a valid prospective waiver of 
all traditional fiduciary duties and moved the inquiry to the 
Certificate.91  The Court of Appeals did not even consider the 
Operating Agreement, but based its decision on the release of claims 
arising out of Tzolis’ fiduciary duties provided at the time of the buy-
out transaction by means of the Certificate.92 
 
86 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 446. 
87 Id. at 445. 
88 Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 579 (citing Centro, 952 N.E.2d at 1001). 
89 Id. 
90 Pappas, 2010 WL 8367478. 
91 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 445. 
92 Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 580. 
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One might reasonably infer that the Court consciously 
avoided the Operating Agreement knowing that it required potentially 
challenging statutory interpretation.  Even if the Court agreed with 
the Appellate Division, that the Operating Agreement did not 
effectively waive all traditional fiduciary duties, it could have still 
addressed the effectiveness of the waiver even if limited.  A 
prospective waiver of any fiduciary duties would have further 
suggested the lack of such duties, generally, at the time the 
Certificate was executed.93  The Certificate clearly presented an 
easier path to find for Tzolis and uphold the parties’ choice to 
eliminate fiduciary duties.  In taking this path, however, the Court 
chose to forego an opportunity to buttress its decision by pointing out 
that even a partial waiver in the Operating Agreement, as Tzolis 
argued, helped to further establish the effectiveness of the Certificate 
at the time of the buy-out transaction.  While the Court’s intent will 
ultimately remain unknown, the fact remains that the Court of 
Appeals never discussed: (1) which law governed this prospective 
attempt to waive fiduciary duties in the Operating Agreement, or (2) 
whether such a prospective waiver was valid. 
1. Misinterpreting the Decision of the Court of 
Appeals 
Nonetheless, a number of commentators seemingly 
misinterpret Pappas to suggest that the case established LLC 
members’ rights to prospectively waive fiduciary duties under New 
York law.  For example, one commentator wrote that “[f]ollowing the 
decision in Pappas, it can be said with a high degree of certainty that 
New York indeed permits the complete waiver of LLC member 
fiduciary duty via contract (but still subject to the limitations of 
Section 417 of the NY LLC Law).”94  Similarly, another 
commentator also discussed the decision in Pappas in connection 
with § 417 of New York LLC statute and stated that the Court 
 
93 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 450.  Consistent with the dissenting opinion of the Appellate 
Division, the focus of Tzolis’ argument at the Court of Appeals shifted from the Operating 
Agreement to the Certificate.  Nevertheless, the questions presented to the Court of Appeals 
by Tzolis’ brief invited the Court to weigh in on the effect of the waiver provision in the 
Operating Agreement, as it related to the effectiveness of the Certificate. 
94 Limiting Fiduciary Duty in New York Entities for Private Placement Offerings, RAISING 
CAPITAL (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.regd-ppm-lawyers.com/limiting-fiduciary-duty-new-
york-entities-private-placement-offerings/. 
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“enforced a contractual waiver of fiduciary duties among LLC 
members.”95  Commentators further discussed Pappas in the context 
of prospective waivers of fiduciary duties, such as those allowed by § 
18-1101 of the Delaware LLC statute.96  Another author seemingly 
concluded that Pappas “permitted waivers of fiduciary duties owed 
to LLC members” based on multiple factors, including the 
antagonistic relationship of sophisticated LLC members, the LLC 
agreement permitting competing business ventures, and the 
Certificate releasing Tzolis from his fiduciary duties.97 
The aforementioned comments on Pappas seem to conflate 
the notion of an ex ante prospective waiver of all fiduciary duties, 
governed by § 417 of NYLLCL, and an ex post release of an existing 
known right.  While the Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the 
latter under the circumstances presented in Pappas, it never even 
discussed the former under either Delaware or New York law.  The 
distinction is important. 
A prospective waiver is a decision by LLC co-venturers to do 
business owing no fiduciary duties to each other or the LLC from the 
very start of their business venture.  Section 417 of NYLLCL affirms 
their right to waive certain duties in the LLC operating agreement, 
but imposes significant limitations on such waivers.  The Certificate 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals in Pappas was not a blanket 
prospective waiver of fiduciary duties and, therefore, did not invoke § 
417 of NYLLCL.  Rather, it represented plaintiffs’ release of their 
known (or knowable) right to a claim against Tzolis in the context of 
a buy-out transaction.  The validity of such a release depended, as the 
Court of Appeals explained, on the particular circumstances of the 
buy-out transaction and the nature of the parties’ relationship at the 
time of that transaction.  Thus, contrary to the assertions of some 
commentators, Pappas provided no insights on the contours of New 
 
95 Arina Shulga, Part III: Fiduciary Duties of LLC Managers in New York, Delaware, and 
Other States, BUS. LAW POST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.businesslawpost.com/2013/11/ 
part-iii-fiduciary-duties-of-llc.html. 
96 Zachary G. Newman & Alison M.C. Schrag, The Enforceability of Fiduciary Duty 
Waivers, 14 COM. & BUS. LITIG. 3 (2013), available at: http://www.hahnhessen.com/ 
uploads/1065/doc/2013_06_zgn_amc_fiduciary_duty_waivers.pdf ; Vincent Syracuse, Paul 
Sarkozi, Jamie Stecher & Zev Raben, Litigation: Can LLC Members Effectively Waive Their 
Fiduciary Duties?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/ 
02/14/litigation-can-llc-members-effectively-waive-their. 
97 Helen (Wendy) J. Williamson & Andrew M. Walsh, New Jersey Eases Fiduciary 
Duties for LLCs, ANDERSON KILL & OLICK, P.C. (Jan. 2013), http://www.andersonkill.com/ 
webpdfext/publications/csu/pdf/New_Jersey_Eases_Fiduciary_Duties_For_LLCs.pdf. 
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York law on the issue of prospective waiver of fiduciary duties in the 
context of an LLC.  By focusing on the release in the Certificate the 
Court of Appeals avoided reviewing the Operating Agreement, a task 
that would probably require a choice of law analysis, and potentially 
commentary on § 417 of NYLLCL. 
2. The Issues Not Decided 
The Court of Appeals, in Pappas, re-iterated that LLC 
members may release claims arising out of their respective fiduciary 
duties.98  But, the high Court did not address, arguably, the most 
interesting and challenging issues that the case presented at the outset 
of the litigation.  First, the parties disagreed on the governing law, 
with respect to the Operating Agreement.  Nonetheless, neither court 
engaged in a choice of law analysis, although the Appellate Division 
seemingly decided that Delaware law governed without any 
explanation.  Second, the Court of Appeals never reviewed the 
validity of the waiver provision in the Operating Agreement under § 
417 of NYLLCL.  The discussion below focuses on these issues 
suggesting that the choice of law clause as well as a prospective 
waiver of a duty of loyalty clause is likely ineffective under the 
NYLLCL. 
a. Choosing Law to Govern an LLC 
Operating Agreement 
While the Vrahos LLC was organized under the Delaware 
law, its members chose New York law in their Operating 
Agreement.99  It is hard to fathom any rational basis for choosing to 
form an LLC in Delaware and then seeking to subject the Operating 
Agreement and internal affairs of that LLC to New York (or any state 
other than Delaware) law.  At a minimum, such approach creates 
uncertainty as to the governing law.  That said, it does present an 
interesting choice of law question. 
A strict application of the relevant statute suggests that the 
choice of law provision in Vrahos’s Operating Agreement was likely 
ineffective.  Section 801(a) of NYLLCL provides: 
Subject to the constitution of this state: (a) the laws of 
 
98 Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 580. 
99 Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 442. 
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the jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability 
company is formed govern the organization and 
internal affairs and the liability of its members and 
managers; . . .100 
Based on the statutory language, this provision appears to be a 
mandatory rather than a default rule.  The default provisions of the 
NYLLCL allow the parties to contract for a different result by 
indicating that they are subject to the parties’ Operating Agreement 
or the LLC’s Articles of Organization.101  Section 801, however, is 
subject only to the New York Constitution, without any suggestion of 
the parties’ right to contract for a different result in the Operating 
Agreement or otherwise.  Hence, unlike the default provisions of the 
NYLLCL, the legislature chose to limit the choice of law provided in 
§ 801 only by the state’s constitution—and not to provide the parties 
with a right to contract otherwise.  The statutory language, when 
strictly applied, renders the parties’ purported choice of New York 
law in Vrahos’s Operating Agreement ineffective. 
However, the Court of Appeals does not always engage in a 
strict application of the statutory language,102 and we found no 
reported appellate decisions reviewing a choice of law clause vis-à-
vis § 801.  Given that an LLC, as a form of business organization, is 
supposed to provide the parties with the most freedom to define the 
governance of their business through contract, one might reasonably 
expect the Court of Appeals to imply the parties’ right to deviate 
from the statute if and when it is faced with this issue. 
b. Prospective Waiver of a Manager’s 
Duty of Loyalty to an LLC 
To the extent the parties’ choice of New York law is upheld, 
the wisdom of such choice with respect to the parties’ intent to 
prospectively waive a managers’ duty of loyalty is questionable at 
best.  A foreign LLC whose members for whatever reason effectively 
subjected the LLC Operating Agreement to New York law, as well as 
a domestic New York LLC, is subject to the limitations set forth in § 
 
100 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 801(a). 
101 See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 406, 407, 414, 420, 603 etc. 
102 See, e.g., Tzolis v. Wolff, 884 N.E.2d 1005 (N.Y. 2008) (in a four to three decision, 
finding a right to bring a derivative action where the legislature clearly did not provide for 
one in the statute). 
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417(a)(1) of NYLLCL.103  The scope of these limitations, as currently 
written, most likely renders any waiver of the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty, such as the one attempted in Vrahos’s Operating Agreement, 
ineffective. 
While LLC members may limit or eliminate manager’s 
personal liability to the members of the LLC under New York law,104 
section 417(a)(1) prohibits the managers, inter alia, from personally 
gaining “in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he or 
she was not legally entitled.”105  In effect, this limitation excludes the 
duty of loyalty, and potentially other duties, from the universe of 
waivable duties.  However, the question of whether Tzolis was 
“legally entitled” to the financial profit at issue presents a classic 
problem of circularity.  One may argue that Tzolis was “legally 
entitled” to act as he did by virtue of the waiver provision in the 
Operating Agreement.  But, such interpretation would effectively 
swallow the limitation in its entirety by “legalizing” any conduct 
through a contractual waiver. 
The Court of Appeals has yet to explain its understanding of 
the statutory language.  In the meantime it appears that the statutory 
limitations, absent some creative interpretation, invalidate any 
prospective attempt by the members to waive the managers’ duty of 
loyalty.106  Moreover, the legislative history of NYLLCL § 417(a)(1) 
strongly suggests that this statutory provision was never intended to 
be read so broadly as to allow the members of an LLC to limit or 
eliminate prospectively the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
New York’s LLC statute vests members with the right to 
prospectively limit or eliminate managers’ liability, but does not 
appear to provide any basis for upholding the members’ attempt to 
prospectively waive any fiduciary duties.  To the extent members of a 
Delaware LLC seek to prospectively eliminate all fiduciary duties, 
they would be ill-advised to attempt a choice of New York law in the 
LLC’s operating agreement given these New York statutory 
limitations.  At best, such choice, if valid, would leave them with 
uncertainty as to the effectiveness of their agreement to proceed 
 
103 See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a). 
104 N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a). 
105 Id. § 417(a)(1). 
106 As discussed above, in New York the duty of loyalty is established by common law 
rather than the statute.  One may reasonably question whether the statute preempts common 
law on the issue of prospective waiver.  This article, however, does not attempt to address 
this potentially complex question. 
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assuming no loyalty to each other or their enterprise. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we take the position that a manager’s fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to an LLC is not subject to prospective waiver under 
current New York law.  However, this perhaps begs the more 
interesting question on this 20th anniversary of the enactment of New 
York’s LLC law—should the law allow for and give full effect to 
such a waiver if clear and unequivocal?  Should New York follow the 
approach of Delaware, or should it continue to hew closely to the 
path originally charted by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon?  
Should New York LLC law limit itself to basic contract rules, or are 
there more important regulatory issues at stake?  Perhaps the time has 
come for the legislature to consider these questions more carefully in 
the specific context of an LLC. 
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